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Not from Guile but from Entitlement: Lawful 
Opportunism Capitalizes on the Cracks in 
Contracts 
GASTÓN DE LOS REYES, JR.† & KIRSTEN MARTIN‡ 
ABSTRACT 
Few concepts have been more pivotal to contract law scholarship 
over the last forty years than the opportunism attributed ex ante 
and ex post to contracting parties, yet the lawful form of 
opportunism identified by Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson in 
1991 remains surprisingly overlooked in favor of the blatant forms 
of opportunism that result from “self-interest seeking with guile.” 
This Article extends Williamson’s inchoate account of lawful 
opportunism and reports the first empirical study of the 
phenomenon. 
The conceptual analysis of lawful opportunism is developed with 
reference to the bargaining underlying the classic impossibility 
decision, Taylor v. Caldwell. Three component elements are shown 
when combined to open “cracks” in contracts that tempt lawful 
opportunism: (1) the background doctrine of literal enforcement 
plus (2) a highly consequential disturbance that (3) strikes at the 
naïveté of the bargain. Because lawful opportunism leverages the 
legal entitlement to sue for breach of contract, its efficacy 
presupposes the counterparty’s express awareness, which makes 
the concept categorically different from the blatant forms of 
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opportunism prevalent in the scholarship. This premise grounds the 
Article’s conclusion that the defining character of lawful 
opportunism is a strong enough sense of entitlement to choose to 
openly press for damages based on the letter of contract, 
notwithstanding the potentially punishing consequences to the 
counterparty of doing so under the circumstances. 
The empirical study reported in this Article was designed to 
explore the individual-level factors that motivate participants to 
resort to lawful opportunism rather than cooperative—or blatantly 
opportunistic—alternatives. Our findings show, inter alia, that 
participants who viewed themselves as more entitled (the top 25% 
of all participants) were three times more likely to choose a lawfully 
opportunistic behavior in the crack of the contract. Lawful 
opportunism springs from a sense of entitlement, the way guile 
fuels blatant opportunism. 
INTRODUCTION 
Today’s leading theories of economic governance 
converge on the premise that humans frequently interact 
with each other strategically,1 as game theory would suggest, 
and also opportunistically, bending or breaking rules to their 
advantage.2 The seminal rendering of the concept is given by 
Nobel Laureate3 Oliver Williamson. The opportunism that 
grounds his theory of transaction cost economics is defined 
as “self-interest seeking with guile,” where guile refers to 
“incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, [and] 
especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.”4 
 
 1. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 25–26 (1975) (describing the various branches of the 
“decision-tree” that can be considered before contracting) (citing THOMAS C. 
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960), and ERVING GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC 
INTERACTION (1969)). 
 2. Williamson clarifies that in his model humans need not always act 
opportunistically, just often enough to impact the governance forms that are 
selected and succeed (or fail). Id. at 27; see also Barak D. Richman & Jeffrey T. 
Macher, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in 
the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1, 4 (2008). 
 3. See generally Peter E. Earl & Jason Potts, A Nobel Prize for Governance 
and Institutions: Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom, 23 REV. POL. ECON. 1 
(2011). 
 4. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
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Few concepts have been more pivotal to contract law 
scholarship over the last forty years than the opportunism 
attributed ex ante and ex post to contracting parties.5 The 
observed and presumed tendency to act opportunistically 
through “calculated efforts . . . to mislead, renege, cheat or 
otherwise take advantage of the vulnerabilities of . . . trading 
partners,”6 has been invoked to make sense of the entire 
warp and woof of the subject. Parties are said to make 
contracts to forestall opportunism,7 and contracts are said to 
break down for failing to do so.8 Courts of law and, especially, 
equity are seen to have evolved the doctrines they did to 
counteract opportunism,9 and decade after decade scholars 
have called on courts to mitigate opportunism in 
contracting.10 
 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47 (1985). 
 5. See id.; see also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Lexical Opportunism and the Limits 
of Contract Theory, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 217, 230 (2016) (attributing to Williamson 
“the importation of opportunism into law professors’ theoretical discussions”). 
 6. Richman & Macher, supra note 2, at 4. 
 7. See Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The 
Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 271–76 (1991); 
see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1989); D. Gordon Smith 
& Brayden G. King, Contracts As Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 16 (2009). 
But see Lipshaw, supra note 5, at 227 (doubting the extent to which contract 
actually limits opportunism). 
 8. See Ian Macneil, Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective 
of Incomplete Contract Theory, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 107, 116 (2001); Alan Schwartz 
& Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 
541, 545–46 (2003); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits 
of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 390 (1993); see also Timothy J. 
Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 
523–25 (1981). 
 9. See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of 
Opportunism 3–7 (Harv. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617413 (discussing the 
development of the “equitable safety valve” as a protection against opportunism). 
 10. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The 
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979) (assessing the 
extent to which basic governance structures produce or address problems arising 
from transaction costs and opportunism); see also George M. Cohen, The 
Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 1016 
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Self-interest seeking with guile comes in many flavors; 
every one presupposes a covertness without which the 
opportunistic gambit would go nowhere. Consider the 
following anecdotes: 
Anecdote 1. A bank has an agreement with a client to provide 
checking account services in exchange for a fee and/or minimum 
deposits. The bank adds additional services to the client account 
without notice or permission, and deducts the corresponding fees 
from the client’s checking account.11 
Anecdote 2. A customer pays a down payment to a builder. The 
builder skips town with the down payment.12 
Anecdote 1 is modeled on the recent Wells Fargo scandal. 
This “too big to fail” bank,13 between 2009 and 2016, drew 
funds from the millions of fake accounts its agents opened, 
without the request of its unsuspecting customers, because 
the customers were unsuspecting.14 By the same token, the 
builder in Anecdote 2 who converts the down payment gets 
to take the cash because the client did not suspect the scheme 
afoot.15 These two examples epitomize the forward-looking 
 
(1992); Muris, supra note 8; Smith, supra note 9. 
 11. This example is based on the recent Wells Fargo scandal. See generally 
Merric Kaufman, “Lions Hunting Zebras”: The Wells Fargo Fake Accounts 
Scandal and its Aftermath, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 434 (2017). 
 12. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93 (6th ed. 2003). The 
opportunistic acts in these examples are morally objectionable in a blatant and 
uncontroversial way. Moreover, detection of the opportunism is unmistakable 
once the damages (viz., bogus fees/lost deposits) are traced to the opportunist’s 
plot. 
 13. Catherine Gallagher Fauver, The Long Journey to “Adequate”: Wells 
Fargo’s Resolution Plan, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 647, 647–48 (2017) (noting 
that Wells Fargo is among the banks deemed “too big to fail” under the Dodd-
Frank Act that are, therefore, subject to “living will” requirements). 
 14. Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently 
Opening Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016 
/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html. 
 15. To be certain, opportunism may also manifest subtly so as to obscure 
detection, sometimes making linkage to the willful breach of the agent who seeks 
to extract, rather than infuse, value all but impossible to establish conclusively. 
There is nevertheless a categorical, even if forgivable, wrong effected by the 
person who intentionally shirks effort in the discharge of contract terms that, 
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dissembling which is the hallmark of the blatant form of 
opportunism that Williamson’s first book, Markets and 
Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications,16 helped 
make central to theorizing in contract law.17 
 
suppose, pay by the hour. The difference with the Wells Fargo breach and the 
take-the-money-and-run case is that the inherent covertness of shirking 
(shirking declared in advance ceases to be shirking) masks the damages too, 
making detection, if any, contested if not constructive, unless confessed. See 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 47. 
 16. See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 1. The fundamental research 
inquiry motivating Williamson’s field-changing contributions with transaction 
cost economics is making sense of why human productive activity—the way we 
pursue economic transactions—should be governed in different ways. The puzzle 
framed in his breakthrough book is understanding why economic activity gets 
organized within hierarchical governance structures that employ workers 
(corporations) rather than through open market exchange. 
This dichotomy is based on Ronald Coase’s seminal 1937 article, The Nature 
of the Firm, and its core insight that the existence of “firms” (hierarchies) not 
built on the “price mechanism” (markets) is explained by the transaction cost 
implications of repeatedly transacting through the price mechanism. See 
generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). For 
example, Coase points out “the difficulty of forecasting” as a key consideration 
that funnels economic activity towards the open-ended realm of master-servant 
relations: “the longer the period of the contract is for . . . the less possible, and 
indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify what the other 
contracting party is expected to do.” Id. at 391. Williamson chooses to build upon 
Coase’s project of “assign[ing] of transactions to one mode or another,” sharing 
the view that human rationality is inherently bounded (as in the difficulty of 
forecasting), and also finding it “to be intrinsically interesting.” WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 1, at 8–9. 
Williamson’s main argument in Markets and Hierarchies is that while 
markets with large numbers of participants serve as a check on the opportunistic 
tendencies of humans in business, this cleansing of opportunism eludes “small-
numbers” bargaining contexts, as with parties who transact repeatedly with each 
other. Id. at 9–10 (observing that “a small-numbers supply condition effectively 
obtains at the contract renewal interval”). Internal organization displaces the 
risk of opportunism that obtains in the small-numbers bargaining context by 
replacing the contract intervals that become sites for opportunism with the 
institution of ongoing employment. See id. at 10, 25–26. 
 17. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing 
and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1150 n.32 (1979) (citing 
Markets and Hierarchies, inter alia, for its “general concept of opportunism”); 
Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market and the 
Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 155 & n.80 (1977) (citing Markets and 
Hierarchies for what “might lead to an increase in opportunistic behavior”); 
Benjamin Klein, et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
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In the voluminous literature that has ensued—not only 
in law18 but also in economics,19 management,20 and 
organization theory21—scholars have plumbed the many-
sided depths of opportunism conceptualized as self-interest 
 
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297 & n.2 (1978) (citing 
Markets and Hierarchies for its discussion of “opportunistic behavior”); see also 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, VA. L. REV. 
1089, 1101 (1981) (quoting Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: 
The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) for his 
definition of opportunism). 
 18. See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing 
Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 119 (2017); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A 
Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2014); 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A 
Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 672 (2010); see also Juliet P. 
Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A 
Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 632 (1993) 
(providing business-related analysis); Lipshaw, supra note 5, at 230. 
 19. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 12, at 93 (providing economic analysis); see 
also Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trust, Communication and Contracts: 
An Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG., 106 (2009). 
 20. See, e.g., Ranjay Gulati & Harbir Singh, The Architecture of Cooperation: 
Managing Coordination Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances, 
43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 781 (1998); Derek J. Harmon, et. al., Breaking the Letter vs. 
Spirit of the Law: How the Interpretation of Contract Violations Affects Trust and 
the Management of Relationships, 36 STRAT. MGMT. J. 497 (2015); Fabrice 
Lumineau & James E. Henderson, The Influence of Relational Experience and 
Contractual Governance on the Negotiation Strategy in Buyer-Supplier Disputes, 
30 J. OPERATION MGMT. 382 (2012); Deepak K. Malhotra & Fabrice Lumineau, 
Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract 
Structure 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 981 (2011); Jeffrey J. Reuer & Africa Ariño, Strategic 
Alliance Contracts: Dimensions and Determinants of Contractual Complexity, 28 
STRAT. MGMT. J. 313 (2007); Libby Weber & Kyle J. Mayer, Designing Effective 
Contracts: Exploring the Influence of Framing and Expectations, 36 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 53 (2011); Libby Weber & Kyle J. Mayer, Transaction Cost Economics and 
the Cognitive Perspective: Investigating the Sources and Governance of 
Interpretive Uncertainty, 39 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 344 (2014); Valery Pavlov & Elena 
Katok, Fairness and Supply Chain Coordination Failures (March 16, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (available at https://www.researchgate.net 
/publication/292374227_Fairness_and_supply_chain_coordination_failures_on_t
he_optimality_of_a_pooling_contract). 
 21. See, e.g., Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith Murnighan, The Effects of Contracts 
on Interpersonal Trust, 47ADMIN. SCI. Q. 534 (2002); Deepak Malhotra & 
Francesca Gino, The Pursuit of Power Corrupts: How Investing in Outside 
Options Motivates Opportunism in Relationships, 56 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 559 (2011). 
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seeking with guile (henceforth, “blatant” opportunism).22 
What theorists (of all fields) have nevertheless overlooked, 
and contract law scholarship has yet to expressly incorporate 
into its conceptual canon, is the novel species of “lawful” 
opportunism that Williamson identified as part of his 1991 
revamping of transaction cost economics.23 
Lawful opportunism is the chief transaction cost concern 
that Williamson highlights in accounting for a third “mode” 
of governance to complement the markets and hierarchies 
that titled his first book.24 “Hybrid” governance, as termed 
 
 22. The “blatant” versus “lawful” distinction owes to marketing scholars the 
one published article known to the authors that expands upon Williamson’s 
account of lawful opportunism. Kenneth H. Wathne & Jan B. Heide, 
Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solutions, 64 J. 
MARKETING 36, 37–38 (2000). Wathne and Heide propose to categorize lawful 
opportunism as hold-up generally, ignoring the case of a highly consequential 
disturbance under literal enforcement that sets forth Williamson’s account. Id. 
at 38–40; compare id., with Williamson, supra note 7, at 271–73; see also 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 47; Richman & Macher, supra note 2. 
 23. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 269 (defining hybrid governance); id. at 
271–73 (discussing contract law and lawful opportunism). While Williamson did 
not define “hybrid governance” as the third basic mode of governance until 1991, 
his earlier work contains variant versions of the trichotomy of modes and reflects 
his abiding concern with relational contracting. See Williamson, supra note 10, 
at 248–50 (distinguishing “market governance,” “trilateral governance,” and 
“transaction-specific governance”). New to Discrete Structural Alternatives is 
Williamson’s articulation of literal enforcement and excuse doctrine as the 
contingent doctrinal representations of the institutions of off-market, arms-
length governance. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 273, 290–91; see also infra 
Section I.C. It is this perspective that reveals the transaction costs of lawful 
opportunism, whose mitigation motivates the Article’s research question. 
 24. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 281 tbl.1; Rudolf Richter, The Role of Law 
in the New Institutional Economics, 26 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 13, 26–27 (2008) 
(reviewing Williamson’s three-mode conception of governance); see also 
discussion supra note 23. This analysis was part of Williamson’s effort to 
formalize the “discrete structural analysis” that distinguishes the institutional 
logic of transaction cost economics. 
Discrete structural analysis is distinguished with the mainstream of 
economics and “its central core of price theory, and its central concern with 
quantities of commodities and money.” Williamson, supra note 7, at 270 (quoting 
Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1, 6–7 (1978)); see also Lipshaw, supra note 5, at 230 (“Oliver 
Williamson and others[] were dissatisfied with how little the classical focus on 
price and output decisions explained the origin and function of markets and 
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by Williamson, comprises the off-the-market, customized, 
negotiated, and yet arms-length transactions that 
organizations and people pursue jointly without the 
advantages of a price mechanism25 to standardize terms over 
large numbers of participants.26 This is the realm of freely 
negotiated relations and dealings, and the contract law that 
provides its institutional foundation is the common law of 
contracts from a typical first-year Contracts course. These 
deals are not the sales contracts governed by the Uniform 
 
structures within them—employment relationship, make or buy decisions, 
corporate horizontal and vertical integrations, and so on.”). The mainstream 
approach to economics leads to “a highly quantitative analysis, in which 
equilibration at the margin plays a central role,” Williamson, supra note 7, at 
270, an approach frequently adopted by law and economics scholars who pose 
research questions as optimization problems (e.g., what is the optimal level of 
corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their 
employees?, see Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given 
the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees, 17 INT. REV. L. 
& ECON. 203 (1997)). Professor Shavell’s scholarship is illustrative in being 
broadly framed thus. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law 
Enforcement, 36 J. L. & ECON. 255 (1993); Steven Shavell, Optimal Discretion in 
the Application of Rules, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 175 (2007); A. Mitchell Polinsky 
& Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability 
of Fines, 35 J. L. & ECON. 133 (1992). In contrast to optimization problems, 
discrete structural analysis inquires after the variant institutional means—the 
distinctive modes of governance and their contingent institutional 
underpinnings—through which economic transactions may be pursued by 
conceptualizing their characteristic virtues and vices “in the ‘main case,’ which is 
not to be confused with the only case.” Williamson, supra note 7, at 286. In 
addition, “each viable form of governance . . . is defined by a syndrome of 
attributes that bear a supporting relation to one another. Many hypothetical 
forms of organization never arise, or quickly die out, because they combine 
inconsistent features.” Id. at 271. This Article drills down to probe the syndrome 
of lawful opportunism that, according to Williamson, contract law engenders in 
hybrid governance. 
 25. Cf. Friedrich August von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. 
ECON. REV. 519 (1945) (discussing the decentralized nature of economic decision 
making based on dispersed information). 
 26. Williamson’s ensuing analysis focuses on hybrid governance executed 
through long-term governance forms. For the reasons discussed infra in notes 42 
and 44, this Article looks to examples of off-market transactions that are one-shot 
deals because these structures are highly vulnerable to the lawful opportunism 
that Williamson characterizes with his eyes on ongoing forms of joint venture. 
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Commercial Code,27 the contractual relations covered by 
employment law,28 or the boilerplate that causes so many 
conceptual difficulties in consumer law.29 Rather, this is the 
domain of free contract, where “the principle of private 
autonomy”30 continues to hold sway. 
In Williamson’s treatment, contracts become susceptible 
to lawful opportunism “[a]s disturbances become highly 
consequential . . . [and] the ‘lawful’ gains to be had by 
insistence upon literal enforcement exceed the discounted 
value of continuing the exchange relationship.”31 Beyond this 
cost-benefit tipping point, the worry—for Williamson as a 
theorist and for entrepreneurs and managers as contracting 
parties—is that “strict enforcement would have truly 
punitive consequences . . . resulting [in] ‘injustice’ . . . 
supported by (lawful) opportunism.”32 
To appreciate the difference between guileful 
opportunism (Anecdotes 1 and 2) and its lawful kin,33 
consider the following anecdotes featuring strict enforcement 
with arguably punishing judgments of enforcement: 
Anecdote 3. A tenant leases land from a landlord for four years, 
without addressing obligations if the tenant cannot occupy the land. 
After the first annual payment, the tenant is driven from the land 
by an occupying army during a civil war and ceases payments. The 
 
 27. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) 
(requiring certain sales of goods valued at $500 or more be in writing). 
 28. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 153–55 (5th ed. 2014). 
 29. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, 
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012). 
 30. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806 (1941). 
 31. Williamson, supra note 7, at 273. 
 32. Id. 
 33. There is a strong family resemblance between Williamson’s lawful 
opportunism and the “lexical opportunism” discussed by Professor Lipshaw. See 
Lipshaw, supra note 5, at 219 (defining lexical opportunism as cases where the 
“interpretation [of the written terms of the deal] creates a potential for staggering 
liability beyond all common sense”). 
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landlord sues the tenant for the missing lease payments.34 
Anecdote 4. A concert promoter and a theater owner agree that the 
promoter will pay $100 per night to rent the venue for four nights, 
without addressing what happens if the owner cannot provide the 
theater. The theater burns down, and both parties suffer economic 
losses. The promoter sues to recover its specific investments 
(promotional expenses), claiming breach of contract.35 
Anecdote 5. A-Corp is building a power plant and requires 
environmental emissions credits. A-Corp enters into a deal to 
purchase the required credits from B-Corp, without addressing 
what happens if B-Corp cannot deliver the credits. B-Corp’s credits 
are revoked by the regulator, and the trading price for the needed 
credits more than doubles. A-Corp sues B-Corp for the increase in 
price.36 
The actions taken by the plaintiff-parties to realize 
damage awards in these examples are not defined by (and do 
not require) trickery or deception, as with the first set of 
anecdotes. On the contrary, since the conduct amounts to the 
pressing of legal entitlements to recover a damage award—
whether through oral demands or the filing of a complaint—
the counterparty’s express awareness is a precondition to the 
efficacy of the exercise. 
What drives parties to act in lawfully opportunistic 
ways?37 Williamson’s high-level sketch demarcates the 
 
 34. This example is based on Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.). 
 35. This example is based on Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 
(K.B.). 
 36. This example is based on Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont 
De Nemours & Co., 118 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. App. 2003). 
 37. The reader may not be convinced that these are instances properly fitting 
the genus “opportunism.” Three replies are offered. The first may be unsatisfying: 
to rigorously defend the proposition that lawful opportunism constitutes a wrong 
requires another article (in process). Second, so long as the reader admits that 
enforcement after calamity is sometimes (if not typically) opportunistic, this 
Article endeavors to provide insight into that phenomenon. Finally, whether one 
agrees that it is opportunistic or otherwise wrongful for a plaintiff to shift to one’s 
counterparty all losses from the calamity to the extent legally permitted, it is 
uncontroversial to observe that no one likes to be on the vulnerable side of that 
equation. Worrying about potentially painful vulnerability in a transaction is a 
real cost that reduces the transactions parties pursue at arms-length, and the 
underlying phenomenon remains to be studied, as this Article does. Why does 
2019] NOT GUILE BUT ENTITLEMENT 11 
economic cost-benefit tipping point that makes legal 
enforcement attractive next to relationship-preserving 
alternatives in a specific context: contractual calamity 
beyond the bounds of the bargain.38 In addition, the account 
specifies the institutional fault line at the root of lawful 
opportunism to be the willingness of courts to hear claims for 
“the ‘lawful’ gains to be had by insistence upon literal 
enforcement” where a highly consequential disturbance has 
undercut the spirit of the deal that was bargained.39 
Beyond this economic and institutional analysis, 
Williamson does not explore the individual characteristics 
that tend to give rise to lawful opportunism, his focus being 
the institutional (macro-level) implications for governance.40 
If the willingness to act with guile stokes blatant forms of 
opportunism (like Wells Fargo’s swindling), what 
characteristic animates lawful opportunism? Absent a micro-
level conceptualization (like the character of guile provides 
blatant opportunism), organizational theorists and 
behavioral legal scholars have little foothold to break ground 
with empirical research that elucidates when and why 
parties experience lawful opportunism and, consequently, 
how to forestall its costs.41 
To fill this conceptual gap, this Article develops and 
extends Williamson’s diagnosis that literal enforcement 
provokes the institutional fault line that foments lawful 
opportunism in Part I.42 This Article’s further contribution 
 
contract law make parties so vulnerable after calamity? What drives parties to 
take advantage of this vulnerability? 
 38. Williamson, supra note 7, at 272–73. 
 39. Id. at 273. 
 40. See generally id. at 269–96. 
 41. For an example of the theoretical utility of guile for organizational theory, 
see Keith G. Provan & Steven J. Skinner, Interorganizational Dependence and 
Control as Predictors of Opportunism in Dealer-Supplier Relations, 32 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 202 (1989) (relying on Williamson’s definition of “self-interest seeking 
with guile” as basis for theorizing empirical study of blatant opportunism). 
 42. Williamson focuses on hybrid governance carried out through what he 
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in Part II is to build upon the analysis set forth in Part I with 
an empirical study designed to examine factors that predict 
variance in the propensity to press one’s legal entitlements 
in conditions ripe for lawful opportunism. Participants were 
presented with a vignette that put them in the position of a 
contracting party who has to respond to a highly 
consequential disturbance that made the counterparty’s 
performance as per the terms of the agreement impossible. 
Participants then selected among a range of options that 
were alternatively cooperative (hence tending to preserve the 
relationship), blatantly opportunistic (i.e., actions to 
appropriate value guilefully), or lawfully opportunistic in 
character (i.e., actions to appropriate value by enforcing, or 
threatening to enforce, legal entitlements). The findings 
concerning the propensity of participants to select lawfully 
opportunistic responses reinforce the conceptual conclusion 
that entitlement is to lawful opportunism as guile is to the 
blatant opportunism so well understood by scholars. 
Why does all this matter for public policy and law? The 
fear of becoming victim to lawful opportunism—for 
entrepreneurs, for managers of business organizations, and 
for citizens at large—presents a transaction cost43 that 
dampens the potential for arms-length contracting to serve 
as a vehicle for ingenuity and productivity. Responding to 
this challenge and potential, the overarching aim of this 
Article is to promote the mitigation of the transaction costs 
of lawful opportunism through theoretical and empirical 
extensions of Williamson’s sparse sketch of the concept. 
 
labels neoclassical contracting devices, such as co-governance through 
committees and reliance upon arbitration. Williamson, supra note 7, at 271–73. 
However, the doctrinal foundations of neoclassical contracting that give rise to 
lawful opportunism also underpin one-shot deals that are negotiated off the 
market by the parties. These transactions are especially “hazardous,” 
Williamson, supra note 10, at 250, precisely for want of the co-governance devices 
that define joint ventures and alliances and the standardization of terms 
achieved by thick markets. Moreover, for the same reasons, litigation over excuse 
doctrine tends to result from one-shot deals like the cases featured in this Article 
as Anecdotes 2–5. See supra notes 12, 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 43. Williamson, supra note 7, at 269. 
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The discussion of results is presented in Part III, and 
Part IV concludes. 
I. CALAMITY, NAÏVETÉ, AND ENOUGH ENTITLEMENT 
YIELD LAWFUL OPPORTUNISM 
Until there is an exchange of consideration between 
parties, there is no contract to anchor lawfully opportunistic 
enforcement. Section A begins, therefore, from the 
bargaining and exchange that give birth to the negotiated 
contracts of hybrid governance,44 and then zeroes in on the 
naïveté that so often limits the bounds of bargaining and 
exchange to the “fair-weather” case—without giving a 
thought to the complications of pricing and risk that highly 
consequential disturbances tend to force upon deals.45 
 
 44. In Discrete Structural Alternatives, Williamson devotes the discussion of 
hybrid governance to the case of long-term contracts that include “neoclassical” 
contracting devices, such as committees and recourse to arbitration. Id. at 271–
73. In an early work before introducing the mode of hybrid governance, 
Williamson acknowledges the category of transactions that are hybrid insomuch 
as they are “nonstandardized” by thick markets but are nevertheless carried out 
through one-shot deals in the form of “market governance,” describing them as 
“hazardous.” Williamson, supra note 10, at 250. His study of transaction cost 
economics does not feature nonstandardized transactions that must be concocted 
by the parties in one-shot deals that have no off-the-rack market. Nevertheless, 
in Discrete Structural Alternatives, Williamson identifies excuse doctrine as a 
check on literal enforcement. Williamson, supra note 7, at 271. The leading cases 
of excuse are illustrative of the hazards of nonstandardized one-shot deals. See 
Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.) (four-performance deal); Krell 
v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (one-day flat rental to view royal procession). This 
Article’s focus is on the hazard of lawful opportunism, as theorized by Williamson 
and as it afflicts nonstandardized one-shot deals. 
 45. Or one or both of the parties might think of a risk and yet leave the deal 
terms unaffected. See, e.g., Krell, 2 K.B. at 755 (Romer, L.J.) (expressing “[t]he 
doubt . . . whether the parties to the contract now before us could be said, under 
the circumstances, not to have had at all in their contemplation the risk that for 
some reason or other the coronation processions might not take place on the days 
fixed”); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2003) (explaining why “parties write deliberately 
incomplete agreements in the shadow of a robust indefiniteness doctrine” partly 
based on variance between “a significant fraction of individuals [who] behave as 
if reciprocity were an important motivation (even in isolated interactions with 
strangers), [and] a comparable fraction [who] react as if motivated entirely by 
self-interest”). 
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Section B introduces the specter of highly consequential 
disturbances that expose the naïveté of the parties. Section 
C examines how literal enforcement comes to spawn lawful 
opportunism. Section D arrives at the conclusion that the 
human linchpin of the phenomenon—and the immediate 
source of the troublesome transaction costs—is the 
complaining party’s strong enough sense of entitlement to so 
lean on the legal entitlement to claim damages. 
A. Bargains, Commitment, and Consideration 
To Karl Llewellyn, principal drafter of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the bargaining that gives rise to contracts 
is the heart of what distinguishes the prevailing liberal 
economic system from those organized by tradition (e.g., 
feudalism, castes) or fiat (e.g., totalitarianism).46 A bargain 
requires a set of agreeable terms concerning the parties’ 
present and future commitments to each other.47 However, 
no matter how much the parties think them through and 
work them out, deal terms do not provide the will to get a 
deal off the ground. What turns an agreement, as a set of 
 
 46. “Bargain is then the social and legal machinery appropriate to arranging 
affairs in any specialized economy which relies on exchange rather than tradition 
(the manor) or authority (the army, the U. S. S. R.) for apportionment of 
productive energy and of product.” Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An 
Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 717 (1931); see also Morris R. Cohen, The 
Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 553 (1932) (noting that the “dictum that 
the progress of the law has been from status to contract . . . . has generally been 
understood as stating not only a historical generalization but also a judgment of 
sound policy—that a legal system wherein rights and duties are determined by 
the agreement of the parties is preferable to a system wherein they are 
determined by ‘status’”). 
 47. An exchange that occurs entirely in the present would be “better described 
as a barter or an exchange of goods” because it “creates no contractual duty.” 
Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal 
Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 171–72 (1917). This bringing of the future into the 
present is called “presentiation” by Ian Macneil. Ian R. Macneil, Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589, 589 (1974) 
(“Presentiation is thus a recognition that the course of the future is bound by 
present events, and that by those events the future has for many purposes been 
brought effectively into the present.”). 
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agreeable terms, into a living deal that inspires each side to 
invest time, money, or energy is enough commitment from 
all parties concerned to execute the exchange.48 
There are numerous sources of commitment that parties 
might draw upon to unlock their mutual willingness to 
consummate the bargain—from secured collateral to down 
payments to reputation.49 How much commitment is 
required of each party depends on many factors, including 
the stakes of the deal,50 the relationship between the 
parties,51 and the availability of other disciplining feedback, 
such as reputation in a shared community.52 Nevertheless, 
as the formal gatekeeper to enforceability in the common 
law, the doctrine of consideration does not require courts to 
assess any reasonable proportionality in the commitments 
entailed by, and exchanged through, contract.53 Rather, the 
 
 48. See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to 
Support Exchange, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520–22 (1983) (expressing skepticism 
about the sufficiency and robustness of the commitment undergirded by contract 
law and discussing the important role of hostages in backing credible 
commitments). 
 49. In commercial transactions, collateral is often secured, in part, through 
contracts. Historically, humans were not infrequently delivered as hostages to 
back commitments. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., references this practice in 
recounting that “the surety of ancient law was the hostage, and the giving of 
hostages was by no means confined to international dealings.” OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 248 (1881). The human hostage as a contractual 
security seems to be uncommon today, certainly outside the realm of organized 
crime and terrorism. Still, the use of hostages is prevalent and typically takes the 
form of forfeit or property as collateral. See Williamson, supra note 48, at 522. 
 50. See Williamson, supra note 48, at 522 (addressing the demands for 
commitment presented by “[c]osts that are highly specific to a transaction”). 
 51. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 
WIS. L. REV. 483, 485 (recognizing “that discrete exchange [without 
relationship] . . . can play only a very limited and specialized function in any 
economy”). 
 52. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal 
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 157 
(1992) (providing “explanations of why the diamond industry has long relied on 
the extralegal enforcement of its business norms”). 
 53. “[S]o long as the requirement of a bargained-for benefit or detriment is 
satisfied, the fact that the relative value or worth of the exchange is unequal is 
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threshold inquiry to establish contract formation looks to the 
mutual exchange of commitment, as of a moment in time.54 
The willingness of common law courts to enforce 
contracts—with nothing more than evidence of exchange55—
lubricates the economy with commitment “when 
reputational or self-enforcement sanctions will not avail.”56 
The enforceability of contracts thus works a feat of alchemy: 
A deal that might have started with no collateral at all 
(beyond each party’s words) yields, in its breakdown, a 
judgment that may be backed by the state.57 Contracts are, 
therefore, attractive—if not unavoidable58—sources of 
commitment in arms-length contracting, as they empower 
 
irrelevant so that anything which fulfills the requirement of consideration will 
support a promise, regardless of the comparative value of the consideration and 
of the thing promised. The rule is almost as old as the doctrine of consideration 
itself.” 3 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:21 (4th ed. 2018) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 54. “[C]lassical contract law draws clear lines between being in and not being 
in a transaction; e.g., rigorous and precise rules of offer and acceptance prevail 
with no half-way houses where only some contract interests are protected or 
where losses are shared.” Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term 
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 
72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 864 (1978). 
 55. According to Professor Corbin, “[t]here seems to be no serious doubt that 
a mutual agreement to trade a horse for a cow would be an enforceable contract, 
even though it is made by two ignorant persons who never heard of a legal 
relation and who do not know that society offers any kind of a remedy for the 
enforcement of such an agreement.” 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 34, at 135 (1st ed. 1950) (as quoted by Gregory Klass, Three Pictures 
of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1754 
(2008)). 
 56. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 562 (2003). 
 57. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract is Not Promise; Contract is Consent, 45 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 662 (2012) (“[T]here [is] not one, but two ‘promises’ [that 
give rise to contract]: the promise to perform, and the promise to be bound by the 
default rules supplied by the law of contract.”). 
 58. Contracts are unavoidable in the sense that no formality, or even an 
exchange of words, is required beyond the fact of exchange. See CORBIN, supra 
note 55. But see Barnett, supra note 57, at 652 (proposing that “the presence of a 
bargain in the commercial context could be negated by evidence that the parties 
did not intend to be legally bound”). 
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parties with a legitimate process for making state-backed 
demands upon a counterparty who has allegedly breached. 
B. Naiveté, Calamity, and the Speechless Deal 
One of the cardinal rules of contract law is that “[c]ourts 
cannot make agreements for persons who are competent to 
make them for themselves.”59 Because competence means 
legal competence—rather than some requirement of 
professional competence to incur obligations—courts enforce 
contracts without differentiating between doctrine governing 
agreements drawn up by parties who are savvy in their 
planning for potential disruption, and naïve parties who are 
not. If performance never gets complicated by contingency, 
then naïveté in the bargain remains immaterial as the 
parties at the time of performance will be bolstered by 
economic terms that hew with their bargain. 
Sometimes, though, naïveté in the bargain comes back to 
haunt the parties.60 Consider the leading case of Taylor v. 
Caldwell—the inspiration behind Anecdote 4 and the 
empirical study reported in Part II. Taylor and Lewis agreed 
with Caldwell and Bishop that the latter two would provide 
the Surrey Gardens and Music Hall for four performance 
days over the summer, at a per diem rate, with sundry 
entertainments included in the fee.61 There is no evidence 
 
 59. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co. v. Evans, 55 A. 373, 376 (Md. 1903). The court 
adds, “when attempts to enter into obligations fail because of the obscurity of the 
terms employed it is far better that the parties be left where they have placed 
themselves than for the judicial tribunals by forced interpretations to construct 
agreements for them.” Id.; see also Arthur L. Corbin, Book, The Effect of War on 
Contracts, 55 YALE L.J. 848, 849 (1946) (book review). 
 60. Whereas the naïve bargain may yield a contract that is “obligationally” 
complete (assuming literal enforcement), economists would call it “insufficiently 
state contingent.” See Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 585, 585–589 (Peter 
Newman ed., 1998). 
 61. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 310 (K.B.). The agreement 
spells out in impressive detail the array of entertainments that Caldwell and 
Bishop committed to provide. For example, along with “an efficient and organised 
military and quadrille band,” there would also be “fireworks and full 
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whatsoever that the parties had a shared understanding 
about what should happen in case the Music Hall and 
grounds could not be made available, as in the case of the fire 
that occurred in June before the first show.62 What deal had 
the parties made? Was each side to suffer its own expenses 
at the time of the fire, was the deal something else, or was 
there no deal at all on the question?63 According to Justice 
Blackburn in the lead opinion, “[t]he parties when framing 
their agreement evidently had not present to their minds the 
possibility of such a disaster.”64 
How could these parties fail to strike a deal covering the 
risk of fire? Humans are optimistic,65 talk of risks quells the 
excitement of bargains, and parties who do not know any 
better are wont to get carried away by the fair-weather case 
apparently in view.66 When this happens, the bargained deal 
is bounded in its scope by fair-weather conditions insomuch 
as the parties did not price and allocate risks otherwise. In 
Taylor v. Caldwell, the parties’ naïveté was failing to plan for 
the possibility that the Music Hall might not be available as 
promised. Perhaps the most compelling evidence that the 
parties failed to consider this contingency is that they were 
 
illuminations; a ballet or divertissement, if permitted; a wizard and Grecian 
statues; tight rope performances; rifle galleries; air gun shooting; Chinese and 
Parisian games; [and] boats on the lake.” Id. at 311. 
 62. Id. at 311–12. 
 63. Cf. Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of 
Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (1991). (“Our hypothesis is that the 
characteristic and traditional response of our legal system to cases of mistaken 
and frustrated contracts is neither to relieve the disadvantaged party nor to 
assign the loss to the superior risk bearer, but to leave things alone.”). 
 64. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 312. 
 65. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 199, 204 (2006) (discussing the “[o]ptimism bias[, which] refers to 
the tendency of people to believe that their own probability of facing a bad 
outcome is lower than it actually is”). 
 66. Cf. Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
277, 278 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (“Incomplete contracts sometimes will not 
condition on payoff-relevant information—here the nature and probabilities of 
future states of the world—even when both parties know it.”). 
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savvy about, and expressly attended to, other contingencies 
of comparatively trivial import: the commitment to provide 
“aquatic sports” at the Gardens was “weather permitting,” 
and the presentation of “ballet or divertissement” depended 
on obtaining the requisite permits.67 
We know that as of closing (i.e., offer and acceptance),68 
the Taylor v. Caldwell parties had contemplated a number of 
details, including the precise number of players required in 
musical bands (35 to 40) and how many wizards would 
entertain (1), because they provided for a relevant 
commitment in the agreement.69 However, the agreement 
does not evidence that they gave any attention to terms for 
fire. Therefore, the court’s conclusion seems the only 
reasonable assumption: the risk of fire was not priced into 
the deal, because the parties apparently never bargained to 
allocate the resulting risks.70 The problem is not that they 
once knew the answer but forgot to write it down.71 The 
problem is that they were naïve about the risk of fire that 
materialized, and the complexities of that class of 
contingencies did not figure into the deal at all.72 When the 
 
 67. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 311. 
 68. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 69. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 311. 
 70. Id. at 312. 
 71. See Derek J. Harmon et al., Breaking the Letter vs. Spirit of the Law: How 
the Interpretation of Contract Violations Affects Trust and the Management of 
Relationships, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 497, 498 (2015) (defining “spirit [of the 
contract] violations as the failure to fulfill an undocumented, yet still presumably 
tacitly agreed upon, expectation”). 
 72. Parties are not prescient but rather limited by bounded rationality, 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 21–23, and yet the fault lines of the deal are known 
in advance. In a supply agreement, where one party pays the other for a good or 
service, the seller may be unable to perform, tracking impossibility doctrine, see 
Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 312, or may lose reason to perform due to commercial 
impracticability, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981), and the buyer may lose reason to buy due to frustration of purpose, see 
Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740, 740. There is also the possibility that the buyer 
is unable to pay when due, and this also represents an important fault line that 
complicates contracting. In legal terms, however, this last case presents no 
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parties most needed clarity, the deal was rendered 
speechless to say anything of substance. 
The naïveté that left the Taylor v. Caldwell deal so 
vulnerable to fire presupposed no guile at all. Honesty and 
candor at the bargaining stage will not immunize a contract 
from this vulnerability. The objective of the next Section 
(Section C) is to demonstrate how literal enforcement 
converts this vulnerability into contractual cracks liable to 
host lawful opportunism. 
C. Literal Enforcement Hardens Naïveté into Cracks 
Justice Blackburn, in the leading opinion for the Queen’s 
Bench in Taylor v. Caldwell, begins his legal analysis with 
the assessment, already previewed, that “[t]he parties when 
framing their agreement evidently had not present to their 
minds the possibility of such a disaster [as the burning down 
of the Music Hall], and have made no express stipulation 
with reference to it.”73 Given their naïveté towards fire risk, 
what the Taylor v. Caldwell parties owe each other after the 
fire is a question beyond the bounds of the actual bargain 
they expressed. The motive of the litigation was precisely 
that “the answer to the question must depend upon the 
general rules of law applicable to such a contract.”74 
The first general rule of law that Justice Blackburn 
formulates is the doctrine of literal enforcement 
undergirding Williamson’s characterization of lawful 
opportunism: “There seems no doubt that where there is a 
 
doctrinal or conceptual difficulties: If performance was tendered, the buyer’s 
payment obligation survives non-payment, and if the buyer repudiates for 
inability to pay before performance is tendered, the seller’s obligation is 
discharged under the doctrine of bilateral contracts. See Keith A. Rowley, A Brief 
History of Anticipatory Repudiation in American Contract Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 
565, 609 (2001) (noting that “[t]he [first] Restatement provided that a promisor 
[who] committed an anticipatory breach of a bilateral contract, excus[ed] the 
promisee from performing any condition precedent or any return promise” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 73. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 312. 
 74. Id. 
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positive contract to do a thing, not in itself unlawful, the 
contractor must perform it or pay damages for not doing it, 
although in consequence of unforeseen accidents, the 
performance of his contract has become unexpectedly 
burthensome or even impossible.”75 The doctrine of literal 
enforcement, in the stringent form here articulated, says 
that in the first instance courts do not condition performance 
on account of “unforeseen accidents” that render 
performance “unexpectedly burthensome,” unless the 
accident was somehow expressly accounted for. This 
expresses the default rule in the common law that “promises 
must be kept though the heavens fall.”76 The “de rigeur 
citation” for this proposition is the 1647 case, Paradine v. 
Jane (Anecdote 3),77 in which the court required the 
defendant-tenant, forcibly expropriated from years of 
tenancy by civil war, to pay damages for back rent.78 The 
cited holding is that “when the party by his own contract 
creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make 
it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by 
inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against 
it by his contract.”79 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 13.1, 
at 495 (4th ed. 1998); see also 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§ 1 (1963) (observing “the long tradition that ‘justice’ is absolute”). 
 77. Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-
Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521 n.4 (1985); see also Alan Schwartz & 
Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule Project, 102 
VA. L. REV. 1523, 1535 & n.36 (2016) (attributing to Paradine v. Jane the rule 
that “the risks associated with performance of an obligation assumed by contract 
are assigned by default to the promisor”); Execution of a Contract Impossible, 10 
AM. JUR. 250, 251–52 (1833) (same). 
 78. Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897–98 (K.B.). 
 79. Id. at 897; see also FRIEDRICH KESSLER & GRANT GILMORE, CONTRACTS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS 758 (2d ed. 1970) (observing that Paradine v. Jane is 
typically cited as the “leading case for the proposition” that the law traditionally 
did not recognize an impossibility excuse). But see id. (“Paradine v. Jane does not 
appear to have been a particularly famous case in its day or for a hundred and 
fifty years thereafter.”). As soon as it joined the canon in the 19th century, 
Paradine v. Jane was criticized in the American Jurist: “I do not hesitate to say 
22 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
When calamity strikes a contract in naïveté’s blind spot 
(e.g., the Music Hall fire),80 literal enforcement turns the 
boundedness of the deal into a sharp “crack” in the contract. 
This crack invites a breach claim based on appeal to the 
premise of literal enforcement. The metaphor of the crack 
alludes to the wedge that calamity drives between the 
economic expectations embedded in the naïve deal that was 
bargained and the economic implications of a breach claim 
based on literal enforcement of the contract post-disruption. 
The hope that energized the original deal is now bygone, and 
yet the colorable breach of contract claim provides the party 
disappointed by non-performance a vehicle to offset the costs 
of calamity. According to Williamson, “[t]he general 
proposition here is that when the ‘lawful’ gains to be had by 
insistence upon literal enforcement exceed the discounted 
value of continuing the exchange relationship, defection from 
the spirit of the contract can be anticipated.”81 The empirical 
question this Article sets out to elucidate is what else, other 
than the raw economic incentive to do so, drives contracting 
parties to choose a lawfully opportunistic response to 
calamity. What remains, therefore, is to characterize the 
trait that activates lawful opportunism the way guile 
activates blatant forms of opportunism.82 
D. The Sense of Entitlement Behind Lawful Opportunism 
The legal entitlement of the potential plaintiff to push 
 
that the doctrine that it lays down is in direct opposition to common sense and 
common justice.” Execution of a Contract Impossible, supra note 77, at 251. 
 80. The contract would be vulnerable even without literal enforcement 
because there is an actual crisis to respond to that puts new demands on the 
parties and their relationship. 
 81. Williamson, supra note 7, at 273. 
 82. Arguably, the idea of guile is inherent in the forms of blatant opportunism 
(i.e., What is lying or stealing without guile?) so that the idea that guile gives rise 
to blatant opportunism may be better interpreted as conclusory rather than 
causal. Just the same, the concept of lawful opportunism as introduced by 
Williamson remains so inchoate that the character trait in which it inheres 
remains to be named and elucidated. 
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for the hard bargain in a lawfully opportunistic way lies 
dormant until activated. Whereas blatant forms of 
opportunism require guile for the agent to surreptitiously get 
away with the benefits of, say, stealing, the visibility of the 
activities involved in lawful opportunism requires the agent 
to openly embrace the stratagem adopted. The analytical 
approach in this section will be to probe the negative 
repercussions of lawful opportunism in light of its necessary 
transparency and openness. 
Williamson’s transaction cost concern for hybrid 
governance is focused on those cases where “strict 
enforcement would have truly punitive consequences, . . . 
especially if the resulting ‘injustice’ is supported by (lawful) 
opportunism.”83 The punishing form of justice that is the 
hallmark of literal enforcement has been noted by 
commentators for centuries.84 An early student note in the 
Harvard Law Review succinctly summarizes this Part and 
why injustice results: 
It is usually to the interest of both parties that a contract be carried 
out. Where performance is prevented by an event, against the 
occurrence of which neither can reasonably be held to have 
warranted, both suffer a loss for which neither is responsible. In 
such circumstances it seems highly unjust to throw all the loss on 
the one whose performance may happen to have been interfered 
with.85 
Scholars continue to debate how best to handle these 
cases given that literal enforcement is a blunt instrument 
 
 83. Williamson, supra note 7, at 273 (stating, “the state realization in 
question was unforeseen and unforeseeable (different in degree and/or especially 
in kind from the range of normal business experience)[, even] if strict 
enforcement would have truly punitive consequences”). 
 84. Execution of a Contract Impossible, supra note 77, at 251; see also Maxine 
MacKay, The Merchant of Venice: A Reflection of the Early Conflict between 
Courts of Law and Courts of Equity, 15 SHAKESPEARE Q. 371, 373 (1964) 
(discussing Portia’s plea that mercy is mightier than the literal enforcement of 
the contract that would exact a pound of flesh). 
 85. Note, Impossibility of Performing Contracts as a Defense, 15 HARV. L. REV. 
63, 64 (1901). 
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when calamity strikes at the naïveté of a contract.86 As the 
law stands, the potential for literal enforcement represents 
an invitation to press legal entitlements, where accepting the 
invitation requires one to overlook or otherwise accede to the 
relationship-destroying injustice that may result from 
enforcing the crack in the contract for one’s cash interest or 
the disciplining leverage thereby derived. 
The human tendency to overlook the potential injustice 
that results from claiming legal entitlements was identified 
by Aristotle as the vice that the virtue of epieikeia, or 
decency, corrects or avoids.87 The discussion of epieikeia in 
the Nicomachean Ethics comes as Aristotle confronts the 
implications of the inherent limitations in legislated law 
that, though bound to fail in its application to specific cases, 
nevertheless gets interpreted to reach all cases that fit the 
text.88 To display the virtue of decency is to rely on 
discernment to “to rectify the deficiency” that is inevitable in 
the application of legislation to facts.89 Aristotle’s 
 
 86. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and 
Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207 (2009) (proposing various tests for 
providing relief in cases of unexpected occurrences); Victor P. Goldberg, Excuse 
Doctrine: The Eisenberg Uncertainty Principle, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 359 (2010) 
(criticizing Eisenberg’s 2009 article); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, 
Impracticability, and Frustration—Professor Goldberg Constructs an Imaginary 
Article, Attributes it to Me, and then Criticizes It, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 383 (2010) 
(responding to Goldberg’s criticism). 
 87. In Aristotle’s framework, virtues represent the “golden mean” between too 
little and too much of some character trait. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 44–
45 (trans. Terence Irwin) (1985). The courageous person, for example, strikes at 
the balance between cowardliness and brashness. Id. at 49. In his discussion of 
decency, reviewed infra, Aristotle only discusses the “stickler” who has too much 
entitlement. The other vice, not mentioned, would display too little sense of 
entitlement, i.e., being a pushover who lets others override their entitlements 
willy nilly. 
 88. ARISTOTLE, supra note 87, at 144 (reasoning that “all law is universal, but 
in some areas no universal rule can be correct; and so where a universal rule has 
to be made, but cannot be correct, the law chooses the [universal rule] that is 
usually [correct], well aware of the error being made” (alterations in original)). 
Aristotle emphasizes that “the source of the error is not the law or the legislator, 
but the nature of the object itself.” Id. 
 89. Id. at 145. 
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characterization of the way the decent person acts and, more 
specifically, does not act provides the missing insight to 
complete the basic account of lawful opportunism. The 
decent person is “not an exact stickler for law in the bad 
way,”90 whereas Williamson’s lawful opportunist is indeed a 
stickler for the letter of the contract in a potentially 
punishing way.91 How does decency rectify the (legislated or 
contractual) law? Aristotle’s answer is that the decent person 
“tak[es] less than he might even though he has the law on 
his side.”92 
What decency regulates is precisely the agent’s sense of 
entitlement to claim legal entitlements. To choose lawfully 
opportunistic enforcement of the breach of contract claim, 
one’s sense of entitlement must be strong enough, or blind 
enough, under the circumstances to overshadow the 
potentially punishing consequences of literal enforcement. 
The conceptual significance of this conclusion becomes 
salient in juxtaposition with blatant opportunism. The 
blatant opportunist may desire the spoils of fraud or deceit 
without necessarily embodying a robust enough sense of 
entitlement to claim like value openly. Conversely, the 
lawful opportunist may flinch at the prospect of bending or 
breaking rules guilefully. Hence, while both strategies may 
serve to appropriate value, each taps into, and arises from, 
distinctive character traits. 
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
This Article’s research motivation is not only to better 
understand lawful opportunism as a concept, but also to 
begin to make sense of lawful opportunism as an empirical 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Williamson, supra note 7, at 273. 
 92. ARISTOTLE, supra note 87, at 145. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
does not address the question of whether decency is ever consistent with taking 
more than one’s legal entitlements, as suggested by cases of justifiable civil 
disobedience. 
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phenomenon. Supposing literal enforcement (with or without 
excuse doctrine93), what are the sources of variance in the 
likelihood that a contract will break apart due to lawfully 
opportunistic contracting behaviors? 
To break ground on this question, we pursued an 
empirical study designed to explore the individual-level 
factors that motivate participants to access lawful 
opportunism as a contracting behavior distinct from 
behaviors that are cooperative or blatantly opportunistic. 
While actual contracts and contracting contexts would 
provide an ideal setting for the study of these phenomena in 
terms of ecological validity, natural and field experiments 
are problematic for research into a novel construct given the 
lack of control over extraneous variables. We therefore test 
the theoretical construct of lawful opportunism through a 
contracting experimental survey. 
In designing this study, this Article draws insights and 
methodological precedents from recent scholarship in 
organization theory that examine contracting parties’ 
contingent dispositions toward deals and their propensity to 
engage in blatantly opportunistic violations of trust.94 These 
studies point to the relevance of three relational dispositions 
that are especially plausible moderators of an agent’s 
willingness to abandon the contracting relationship for the 
monetization of the breach of contract claim. These relational 
 
 93. This Article has sought to make clear that the risk of lawful opportunism 
is not obviated by the possibility of excuse. Excuse mitigates the degree of 
punishment caused by lawful opportunism—instead of paying for litigation 
defense and damages, only paying for litigation defense. Moreover, the case 
behind Anecdote 5 is a reminder that excuse is a fickle doctrine, not to be counted 
on, even after a favorable verdict. See Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. E.I. Du 
Pont De Nemours & Co., 118 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. App. 2003) (reversing a verdict of 
commercial impracticability at the trial court finding no evidence that the 
buyer—and not only the seller—understood at the time of exchange that the 
environmental credits the seller was committing to sell were the credits owned 
by the buyer that the state department of environmental protection cancelled 
unexpectedly before delivery). 
 94. See, e.g., Malhotra & Gino, supra note 21, at 559, 561–62; Malhotra & 
Murnighan, supra note 21, at 534, 553, 557. 
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dispositions are the agent’s (1) sense of entitlement (as 
indicated by Part I’s analysis) and the agent’s sense of the 
exchange as being predominantly either (2) economic or (3) 
relational.95 The latter two may influence perceptions of the 
trade-off involved in either cooperating with the 
counterparty or defecting from the deal for the lawful gains 
available, and there is the further question of their influence 
upon the predilection to choose the blatantly opportunistic 
alternatives presented to participants in the study. 
A. The Study 
1. Subjects 
Participants were 1,300 U.S. adults recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Respondents received $1.30 for 
participating. Fifty-seven percent of the subjects were male 
and the average age category was 25–34 years old with 35% 
over 35 years old. The participants were randomly assigned 
a contracting scenario, which varied based on the specificity 
of the contracting statement and the type of disruption. See 
Table 1 for descriptive statistics of the sample. 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics of Sample. 
Index Variable mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 
Cooperate  
Factor 
6.1 1.3 1        
2 
Lawful Opp  
Factor 
9.0 3.1 0.07 1       
3 
With Guile 
Factor 
3.5 2.8 -0.19* 0.37* 1      
4 
Intended  
Honesty 
75.3 32.8 0.14* -0.13* -0.46* 1     
5 Entitlement 4.0 0.9 0.08* 0.33* -0.03 0.10* 1    
6 
Economic  
Exchange 
4.2 0.8 0.14* 0.05 -0.28* 0.25* 0.18* 1   
7 
Relationship 
Exchange 
3.3 1.0 0.17* -0.18* -0.23* 0.29* 0.06 0.11* 1  
8 
Trust  
Disposition 
48 46.0 0.07* -0.07* -0.19* 0.30* 0.01 -0.02 0.27* 1 
 
 95. See Malhotra & Gino, supra note 21 at 566 (discussing how parties may 
view exchange partners in “instrumental (e.g., ‘money-making’)” or “relational” 
terms). 
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B. Methods 
1. Design 
To answer our research questions, we used controlled 
contracting surveys with a variety of contracting scenarios 
included as a vignette. Respondents were then asked the 
likelihood they would take a series of actions. 
2. Contracting Conditions 
The base contracting scenario was seen by all 
respondents, and is based on the case of Taylor v. Caldwell 
(Anecdote 1), involving the renting of a theater for a 
performance. The base scenario starts with a hypothetical 
agreement. The respondents read the following: 
You produce concerts through your business, and you focus on 
festivals. For this year’s Memorial Day Festival, you have reserved a 
venue close to the ocean. The Ocean View—an Inn with large 
grounds—has offered its grounds in exchange for $6,000: $1,500 as 
a deposit and $4,500 one month before the event. 
With the venue secured, you then book the infrastructure needed—
security, portable toilets, food vendors, etc.—as well as booking the 
acts and you begin to sell tickets. 
This scenario is designed to create the potential for real 
damages, specifically, the loss of deposits paid to 
subcontractors and potential loss of revenue. In order to 
capture intended contracting behavior over a range of 
contracting contexts, we varied two aspects of the 
contracting scenario in the survey: (1) whether there was a 
clause in the contract that addresses the potential for 
disruption and, if so, whether it addresses disruption in a 
generic or a specific way; and (2) the type of disruption. The 
respondents were assigned one of three possible conditions: 
a generic condition that addresses the potential for 
disruption generically, a null condition (with no qualifying 
language in the agreement), and a specific condition that 
addresses the potential for a specific kind of disruption. After 
reading the scenario and then responding to a question about 
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their intention to act honestly,96 one of two disruption 
conditions is introduced to respondents—one concerning a 
natural disaster (a hurricane) and one concerning a 
regulatory change (environmental regulation)—both of 
which would render the event impossible to host as agreed. 
In both cases of disruption, the participant was told that an 
alternative venue is available at an extra cost. See Appendix 
B for specific clauses included. 
3. Dependent Variables—Contracting Behavior 
To capture the intention to act cooperatively, in a 
lawfully opportunistic fashion, or in a blatantly opportunistic 
fashion, the participants were asked to assess the likelihood 
they would take different actions, having been confronted 
with a highly consequential disturbance that prevented 
performance as expected. The respondents were asked “How 
likely would you take the following action?” and given a 6-
point scale of definitely, very probably, probably, possibly, 
probably not, and definitely not. The options included actions 
categorized as lawful opportunism (such as making demands 
and threatening suit), blatant opportunism (such as shirking 
and fraud), or cooperation (such as making requests and 
problem solving). Four sub-types for each type of contracting 
behavior were included, as shown in Table 2 below. 
  
 
 96. See id. (using a questionnaire to assess “willingness to behave 
opportunistically, sense of entitlement, and level of aspiration”). 
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TABLE 2. Intended Actions. 
Contracting 
Behavior 
Sub-type Operationalized in Survey Options 
Cooperative 
Actions:  
Fair play, honest 
dealing, complying 
with agreements, 
commitment.97 
Information 
exchange and 
coordination.98 
Honest dealing 
Call back the The Ocean View to find out what 
the owner has in mind 
Information 
exchange 
Suggest to the owner of The Ocean View that you 
should discuss the consequences of the change in 
circumstances to figure out the best way to share 
the burdens 
Coordination 
Suggest to the owner of The Ocean View that you 
should invite a third-party to help you figure out 
how to deal with the burdens of the change in 
circumstances 
Request for 
refund 
Request that The Ocean View refund you the 
$6,000 you paid in advance 
Lawful 
Opportunism: 
Demands, Threat of 
law suit, Law suit 
 
 
Demand for 
refund 
Demand that The Ocean View refund you the 
$6,000 you paid in advance 
Demand to 
cover increased 
costs 
Demand that The Ocean View pay the additional 
$2,000 you will have to pay the state college to 
put on the festival at the stadium (the state 
college charges $6,000 and the Inn charged only 
$4,000) 
Demand to 
cover out of 
pocket losses 
Demand that The Ocean View compensate you 
for the $1,000 you will lose from the portable 
toilets 
Threat of law 
suit for non-
payment of 
demand 
Be prepared to tell the owner of The Ocean View 
that if you do not get what you demand, you will 
file a complaint [with the town to report a zoning 
violation that you noticed the last time you were 
at the property]99 
 
 97. See T.K. Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, Between Trust and Control: Developing 
Confidence in Partner Cooperation in Alliances, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 491, 492 
(1998) (“[P]artner cooperation is characterized by honest dealing, commitment, 
fair play, and complying with agreements.”). 
 98. See Malhotra & Lumineau, supra note 20, at 983–84 (discussing 
information exchange and coordination provisions). 
 99. The bracketed language tracks the cheat act for blatant opportunism, but 
this was an error in the instrument and represents a limitation in the exploratory 
study. The kind of complaint that is consistent with the species of lawful 
opportunism identified by Williamson is one alleging breach of contract. See 
Williamson, supra, note 7, at 273. 
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Blatant 
Opportunism: 
Lie, Cheat, Steal. 
Calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, 
disguise, obfuscate, 
or otherwise confuse 
 
Cheat 
Be prepared to tell the owner of The Ocean View 
that if you do not get what you demand, you will 
report a zoning violation that you noticed the last 
time you were at the property to the town. You 
expect this could cost The Ocean View $5,000 or 
more to address 
Threaten 
to Libel 
Be prepared to tell the owner of The Ocean View 
that if you do not get what you demand, you will 
ask your friend, who is a reporter with the local 
newspaper, to write (undeservedly) negative 
reviews about The Ocean View 
Lie 
Lie to The Ocean View’s owner and say that your 
exposure to losses from the portable toilets is 
actually $1,500 (and not $1,000) and that you 
have to pay the state college an extra $3,000 (not 
$2,000) so that if you have to negotiate at least 
you start from a higher level 
Steal 
If The Ocean View does not give you what you 
demand, you will compensate yourself by letting 
yourself into the Inn and walking away with 
several valuable paintings you noticed in the 
hallways the last time you were there 
 
4. Independent Variables 
To capture the respondent’s perception of entitlement, 
participants rated the degree to which they agreed with the 
statement “I deserve a good deal in this agreement” using a 
slider ranging from -100 to +100 (values were hidden).100 In 
addition, to capture the participant’s perception of the nature 
of the exchange, we asked participants to answer a series of 
four questions using a 5-point Likert-type scale (ranging 
from 1 = not at all, to 5 = extremely likely): To what extent do 
you see your relationship with The Ocean View as 
being . . . (1) an economic relationship . . . (2) as about 
money . . . (3) as being about trust . . . (4) as being about 
working well together. Two exchange constructs were created 
with an economic exchange as the combination of (1) and (2) 
 
 100. See Malhotra & Gino, supra note 21, at 567; Emily M. Zitek, et al., Victim 
Entitlement to Behave Selfishly, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 245, 247–48 
(2010). 
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and a relationship exchange as the combination of (3) and 
(4).101 
5. Control Variables 
After reading the scenario and being informed of the 
disruption, the participants answered a series of questions 
relating to their intention to act honestly and their trust 
disposition. To capture the respondent’s intention to act 
honestly, the participant rated the degree to which they 
agreed with the following statement: How obligated do you 
feel to act in a completely trustworthy and honest manner in 
your dealings with The Ocean View?102 This question serves 
to capture the presence of a propensity of the participant to 
act in a blatantly opportunistic versus honest fashion. To 
capture the respondent’s trust disposition, the participant 
rated the degree to which they agree with the following 
statement: In general, I give people the benefit of the doubt 
until shown otherwise. 
C. Results 
1. Initial Analysis: Lawful Opportunism as a Distinct 
Construct 
Since lawful opportunism, as a contracting behavior, has 
been theorized but not measured, we conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis in order to identify the degree to 
which the outcomes of lawful opportunism, blatant 
opportunism, and cooperation are distinct factors.103 
This analysis is exploratory: exploratory factor analysis 
is designed to explore a data set and not to test hypotheses 
or theories.104 Exploratory factor analysis is well suited to 
 
 101. See Malhotra & Gino, supra note 21, at 567. 
 102. Adopted from id. at 566. 
 103. See Chao C. Chen et al., Guanxi Practices and Trust in Management: A 
Procedural Justice Perspective, 15 ORG. SCI. 200, 203–04 (2004) (use of 
exploratory factor analysis to develop a theoretical construct). 
 104. Anna B. Costello & Jason Osborne, Best Practices in Exploratory Factor 
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identify if outcomes are related but distinct, as the technique 
is designed to explore untested concepts.105 We used an 
iterated principal axis factoring with a promax rotation so as 
to allow for the possibility the factors could be correlated.106 
In order to identify the appropriate number of factors to 
retain, we followed the approach recommended by Costello 
and Osborne,107 using the scree plot of the eigenvalues and 
identifying the natural bend in the data where the curve 
flattens. We used the number of data points above the break. 
The results are in Table 3. We then examined the variable 
loadings (Table 3) to identify the cleanest structure with 
variable loadings above 0.30, few item cross-loadings, and 
factors excluded if fewer than three variables.108 
The promax rotation allows the factors to correlate and 
does not impose orthogonal assumption on the data.109 Table 
3 shows one factor—the first outcome of cooperation (CO1) to 
load on more than one factor—but in opposite directions. 
Similarly, BO1 loads on both blatant opportunism (Factor 1) 
 
Analysis: Four Recommendations for Getting the Most From Your Analysis, 10 
PRAC. ASSESSMENT, RES. & EVALUATION, no. 7, July 2005, at 1, 8. 
 105. See, e.g., Bradley L. Kirkman & Debra L. Shapiro, The Impact of Cultural 
Values on Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment in Self-Managing 
Work Teams: The Mediating Role of Employee Resistance, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 557, 
558, 561 (2001). 
 106. See Costello & Osborne, supra note 104, at 3 (classifying promax rotation 
as an “oblique” method and arguing that “oblique rotation should theoretically 
render a more accurate, and perhaps more reproducible, solution” because it 
“allow[s] the factors to correlate”). 
 107. Id. at 3. 
 108. Id. One of the factors combines two acts that were distinguished only by 
the substitution of the word “request” in the cooperative version and “demand” in 
the lawfully opportunistic rendition: “[Request][Demand] that The Ocean View 
refund you the $6,000 you paid in advance.” We observe that even the demand-
version of the act is truly at, and arguably does not cross, the threshold of lawful 
opportunism. The legal argument for this proposition would be that the demand 
is for restitution (return of money) rather than contract performance. Lon L. 
Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 
46 YALE L.J 52, 54 (1936). For these reasons, the one factor with only two factors 
is not a surprise. 
 109. See Costello & Osborne, supra note 104, at 3. 
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as well as lawful opportunism (Factor 2). 
 
TABLE 3. Exploratory Factor Analysis Results—All Data 
with only loadings > 0.3 shown. 
 
With 
Guile 
Pushing 
Boundaries 
Demand 
Money 
Cooperate  
Variable Factor1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Uniqueness 
CO1 -0.3655   0.3768 0.6521 
CO2    0.7044 0.5111 
CO3    0.3259 0.8596 
CO4   0.8571  0.2543 
LO1   0.9129  0.1875 
LO2  0.8388   0.3279 
LO3  0.6474   0.4812 
LO4  0.8328   0.3195 
BO1 0.4690 0.3741   0.5321 
BO2 0.7623    0.3979 
BO3 0.6712    0.555 
BO4 0.7103    0.4961 
 
The factors are then calculated for each respondent as 
follows based on Table 3: 
WithGuileFactor = -0.3655*CO1 + 0.469*BO1 + 0.7623*BO2 + 
0.6712*BO3 + 0.7103*BO4 
PushingBoundariesFactor = 0.8388*LO2 + 0.6474*LO3 + 
0.8328*LO4 + 0.3741*BO1 
CooperateFactor = 0.3768*CO1 + 0.7044*CO2 + 0.3259*CO3 
While three separate outcome types were anticipated, 
the analysis resulted in four factors encapsulating types of 
contracting orientations. We also ran the exploratory factor 
analysis separately by type of contract and disruption across 
the surveys. The results, found in Appendix B, illustrate 
equivalence in the number of factors as well as in the items 
and weights included in each factor. In other words, 
exploratory factor analysis was resilient across different 
types of contracting scenarios and types of contracts. 
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D. Individual Dispositions Impacting Intended Contracting 
Behavior 
We turn now to the primary empirical question: Who is 
more likely to intend to act with lawful opportunism? To 
answer our research question, the intended action scores 
calculated above from the exploratory factor analysis were 
broken into 25th percentile blocks, with “high” being in the 
top 25% of each factor score. This allowed the analysis to 
capture the likelihood of being in the top 25th percentile of 
acting “with guile” (for example). A logistic analysis is 
summarized in Table 4 for each intended action type (with 
guile, pushing boundaries, and cooperation), where the 
designation of “high” intended action is regressed onto the 
independent and control variables. In order to conduct a 
logistic regression, the independent variables were also 
converted into flag for “high” scores (top 25%) for entitlement 
as well as for the perception of being an economic or 
relationship exchange. 
The results show that respondents who view themselves 
as more entitled (in top 25% of all respondents) are three 
times more likely to act with lawful opportunism (p < 0.01). 
Thus, we find that a contractor’s sense of entitlement impacts 
their intention to act with lawful opportunism; respondents 
with more entitlement are three times more likely to intend 
to act with lawful opportunism. 
We turn again to Table 4 to test the impact of a 
contractor’s perception of the agreement in economic or 
relationship terms. We evaluate the significance of (1) high 
economic exchange on the propensity to act with lawful 
opportunism, as well as the significance of (2) high relational 
exchange on the propensity to act with lawful opportunism. 
The results are presented in Table 4. Respondents who 
perceive the exchange in economic terms are 64% more likely 
to intend to act with lawful opportunism whereas 
respondents who perceive the exchange in relationship terms 
are 29% less likely to intend to act with lawful opportunism. 
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In short, respondents’ perception of the exchange in 
relational versus economic terms positively impacts the 
intention to act with lawful opportunism whereas 
respondents’ perception of the exchange in relational term 
negatively impacts the intention to act with lawful 
opportunism. 
Table 4 also illustrates how blatant opportunism differs 
from lawful opportunism in the individual traits that drive 
intended behavior. For example, men are nearly 1.5 times 
more likely to intend to act with guile (blatant opportunism); 
younger respondents (less than 35 years old) are almost 2.3 
times more likely to intend to act with guile. However, age 
and gender are not significant factors for lawful 
opportunism. 
 
TABLE 4.  Likelihood of being in top quartile for each 
action type. 
 Coefficient (SE)a 
 
High With 
Guile Factor 
High Pushing 
Boundaries Factor 
High Cooperate 
Factor 
High Entitled 0.92 2.94** 1.42* 
(0.14) (0.55) (0.22) 
High Economic 
Exchange 
0.46** 1.64** 1.18 
(0.07) (0.22) (0.15) 
High 
Relationship 
Exchange 
0.54** 0.71* 1.90** 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.25) 
High Intended 
Honesty 
0.36** 1.05 1.23 
(0.07) (0.15) (0.17) 
High Trust 
Disposition 
0.55** 1.01 1.02 
(0.10) (0.15) (0.15) 
Male 1.46* 1.17 0.89 
(0.21) (0.15) (0.11) 
Age Over 35 
0.44** 1.03 0.98 
(0.07) (0.14) (0.13) 
Χ2 192.74 64.18 43.60 
Prob > Χ2 b <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
aOutcome represents the result of the logistical analysis and is presented as 
coefficient (SE); for all, N = 1,370; statistical significance is reported by the 
presence of asterisks (*) where * indicates p < 0.05 and ** p < 0.01.  
bProb > Χ2 represents the probability of obtaining the reported chi-square 
statistic given that the null hypothesis is true (i.e. traditional “p-value” for 
the model, establishing the effect of the independent variables, taken 
together, on the dependent variable) 
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Further, respondents who view the exchange in more 
economic terms (i.e., about money; an economic exchange) 
are 40% less likely to act with guile. Put another way, 
respondents who do not view the exchange in more economic 
terms are two times more likely not to choose to act with 
guile. Respondents who view the exchange as an economic 
one are less likely to act with blatant opportunism, but more 
likely to act with lawful opportunism. 
In sum, the exploratory factor analysis we conducted 
supports Williamson’s theoretical suggestion that lawful 
opportunism represents a distinct construct to characterize 
contracting behavior. This study illustrates how lawful 
opportunism is distinct not only as evidenced by the 
exploratory factor analysis, but also that it differs in the 
behavioral profile of individual-level dispositions likely to 
yield lawfully opportunistic rather than blatantly 
opportunistic acts. More work should be done to understand 
how and under what conditions lawful opportunism 
manifests in contracting, and how it can be prevented. 
 
TABLE 5. Percent of Respondents in the HIGH Intended 
Lawful Opportunism Factor. 
High Lawful Opportunism 
   Entitlement 
Economic 
Exchange 
 Low Very High 
Hi 20% 48% 
N = 284 N = 214 
   
Low 
14% 43% 
N = 660 N = 212 
    
Relationship 
Exchange 
 Low Very High 
Hi 
12% 40% 
N= 310 N= 168 
   
Low 
17% 50% 
N= 634 N= 258 
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses for each 
intended action and illustrates that blatant opportunism has 
a high proportion of “definitely not” (black/dark gray), 
whereas most of the cooperation actions have a high degree 
of “definitely” and “probably” (light gray/white). The lawful 
opportunism options are noticeably more attractive to 
contractors than blatant opportunism, underscoring the 
practical importance of understanding and overcoming this 
transaction cost. 
 
FIGURE 1. Distribution of Responses for Each Intended 
Action.a 
 
aAggregated Data Across Surveys. Variables are abbreviated as follows: BO (blatant 
opportunism), LO (Lawful opportunism), and CO (Cooperation). 
III. DISCUSSION 
This Article’s findings support Williamson’s specification 
of lawful opportunism as a contracting behavior that is 
distinct from the blatant and guileful forms of opportunism, 
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and also from cooperative behaviors that are relationship 
preserving. Crucially, the empirical study reinforces the 
construct validity of entitlement as the wellspring of lawful 
opportunism.110 This was the conclusion of the effort in Part 
I to develop Williamson’s account to address the character 
trait that unlocks this form of opportunism, the way guile 
opens the door to blatant opportunism. Far and away, the 
key factor that emerged as a predictor of an intention to act 
with lawful opportunism, from among those studied, is a 
strong sense of entitlement. Respondents who rated highest 
(top quartile) for a strong sense of entitlement were three 
times more likely than all other respondents to act with 
lawful opportunism. What turns the cracks in contracts into 
lawful opportunism is a strong enough sense of entitlement, 
not only conceptually (as set forth in Part I), but also in our 
study as a predictor of what makes one person more or less 
likely to choose to so act. 
In addition to the sense of entitlement and demographic 
factors, we also studied the influence of the mindset that 
participants brought to the deal vignette—categorized as 
economic or relational. With respect to the influence on 
lawful opportunism, the results support common sense: a 
more economic mindset was more likely (by 64%) to choose 
enforcement strategies in the aftermath of calamity, whereas 
a more relational mindset was less likely (by 29%) to do so. 
Less intuitive was the influence of the economic mindset on 
blatant opportunism. Why were respondents who reported 
an economic mindset so much less likely to act with blatant 
opportunism? One possible explanation is that these 
respondents’ increased attraction to lawful opportunism 
crowded out and displaced the blatantly opportunistic 
alternatives for capturing value post-calamity. What did 
increase the likelihood of intending to act with guile (blatant 
 
 110. See Melenie J. Lankau & Terri A. Scandura, An Investigation of Personal 
Learning in Mentoring Relationships: Content, Antecedents, and Consequences, 
45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 779, 783 (2002) (“Results of the . . . exploratory factor analysis 
pilot study provide preliminary construct validity evidence.”). 
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opportunism) were demographic factors, specifically age and 
gender. Men were approximately 1.5 times more likely to 
intend to act with guile (blatant opportunism), and younger 
respondents (less than 35 years old) were approximately 2.3 
times more likely to intend to act with guile. However, age 
and gender were not significant factors for lawful 
opportunism. 
A. Limitations 
We have stressed that the empirical analysis reported in 
this Article is exploratory in nature. Further study is 
required to confirm the robustness of the tripartite 
conceptualization of contracting strategies (blatant 
opportunism, lawful opportunism, and cooperation) as 
distinctive categories of intended behaviors.111 Analytically, 
these categories are distinct for the reasons set forth in the 
Introduction and Part I. However, in the world of 
contracting, do parties decide how to confront calamity based 
on a predisposition towards one strategy (e.g., tends to act 
guilefully, rather than publicly and lawfully expressing their 
strong sense of entitlement), or by considering the array of 
discrete options, as listed in Table 3, and ranking them 
according to relevant metrics (e.g., out-of-pocket and 
opportunity costs, or reputation effects)?112 Put differently, 
how and in what ways are our study’s findings sensitive to 
the specific array of intended actions presented to 
participants? Regardless, this analysis suggests the 
importance of imagination113 and open-mindedness in 
 
 111. See supra note 99 (addressing a limitation with the instrument). 
 112. See supra Table 2 (detailing intended actions presented to respondents). 
For example, “Demand that The Ocean View pay the additional $2,000 you will 
have to pay the state college to put on the festival at the stadium” versus “Be 
prepared to tell the owner of The Ocean View that if you do not get what you 
demand, you will ask your friend, who is a reporter with the local newspaper, to 
write (undeservedly) negative reviews about The Ocean View.” 
 113. See Patricia H. Werhane, Moral Imagination and the Search for Ethical 
Decision-Making in Management, BUS. ETHICS Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 75, 76 (1998) 
(arguing that unethical actors in business need “moral imagination . . . . [because 
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casting for a broad net of potential next steps as an antidote 
to lawful opportunism. Indeed, one way to think about a high 
tendency to act in a lawfully opportunistic way is fixation on 
one’s sense of entitlement towards the expected value of the 
contract to the exclusion of other ways out of the mess: 
blinkered blindness does the work.114 
In addition, the measurement of cooperation, lawful 
opportunism, and blatant opportunism is driven by theory. 
Further confirmatory analysis should be performed in 
conjunction with the development of instruments to test for 
different contracting contexts and outcomes. 
B. Further Research 
Our exploratory study discloses a number of important 
directions for further empirical and conceptual inquiry. From 
a behavioral and organizational perspective, a key set of 
questions concerns the variety of antecedents that influence 
a contractor’s sense of entitlement in a deal—at the moment 
of choice. There are influences on two levels: (1) the 
individual’s personal predispositions and (2) the history and 
circumstances of the deal and relationship. How do these 
factors interact to underpin choice? With respect to the 
mindset of the participant towards the deal—economic or 
relational—what determines whether a party relates to a 
deal primarily on economic or relational terms? And with 
respect to all these variables, to what extent do individuals 
acting on behalf of organizations rely on their personal 
predispositions and mindsets—for example, when they 
receive a phone call from their counterparty’s agent relaying 
the bad news about the disruption—and to what extent do 
they channel an organizational ethos in those moments of 
truth? 
 
t]hey lack a sense of the variety of possibilities and moral consequences of their 
decisions”). 
 114. Cf. id. at 79 (“Now and again, however, our perspectives become narrow, 
microscopic or even fantasy driven, or a particular point of view becomes 
ingrained so that one begins adopt only that perspective.”). 
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The heartiest conceptual question set aside to 
accomplish this Article’s objectives115 is explicating why 
Williamson was right to lump lawful opportunism with 
blatant opportunism as two species in the same genus. What 
is actually wrong with pressing the legal entitlements that 
one happens to have in contract?116 Put differently, can one 
draw a clean line to separate warranted legal enforcement 
(for example, suits against Wells Fargo by defrauded 
customers (Anecdote 1)), from assertedly opportunistic forms 
of enforcement (for example, Anecdotes 4 to 6)? So far as the 
principles of governance are concerned,117 the matter is 
semantic to the extent the transaction costs are real and 
people get pushed away from deals they would otherwise 
contemplate and pursue.118 Nevertheless, philosophically 
speaking, is it fair to call this opportunism? If so, why? 
A final set of critical questions concern prophylaxis—
both at the institutional and managerial levels. What can 
courts (or legislatures) do to undercut the grip of lawful 
opportunism? Williamson—and the contracts literature 
 
 115. See supra note 37. 
 116. For example, “contract is consent” theorist Randy Barnett might argue 
that the parties’ economic bargain indicates that they intend to be legally bound 
by the contract’s terms, however courts will enforce them, regardless the scope of 
the bargain. See Barnett, supra note 57, at 655. 
 117. According to Williamson, “Lon Fuller’s definition of ‘eunomics’ as ‘the 
science, theory or study of good order and workable arrangements’ is very much 
in the spirit of what I refer to as governance.” Oliver E. Williamson, Revisiting 
Legal Realism: The Law, Economics, and Organization Perspective, 5 INDUS. AND 
CORP. CHANGE 383, 397 (1996) (quoting Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy 
at Mid-Century: A Review of Edwin W. Patterson’s Jurisprudence, Men and Ideas 
of the Law, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 477 (1953)). Fuller understood the insights of 
eunomics to consist in those natural laws that constrain and guide the 
mechanisms of what will actually work to realize ends given the way humans are 
and how they interact institutionally. In this prism, the propensity to lawful 
opportunism poses a limit to the promise of literal enforcement to serve as fitting 
institutional means to economic ends. See Lon L. Fuller, American Legal 
Philosophy at Mid-Century: A Review of Edwin W. Patterson’s Jurisprudence, 
Men and Ideas of the Law, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 447–78 (1953). 
 118. Compare with the unqualified interest in dissuading, for example, con 
artists from entering into contracts by virtue of robust enforcement of breach of 
contract claims. 
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generally119—looks to the fine tuning of excuse doctrine—
more or less strict—though he sees no way around the 
problem entirely.120 Another kind of solution that has been 
suggested is to grant courts the authority to tailor the 
outcome to the facts on behalf of the parties,121 with the 
discretion of the chancellors to craft a fitting remedy.122 If 
radical alternatives are on the table,123 are there any other 
doctrinal strategies available to address the problems 
created by literal enforcement? Switching to the standpoint 
of contracting parties—who must take the law as it is—are 
there generic ways to insulate against the hazards of 
naïveté?124 An exciting line of inquiry is to synthesize the 
learning from the shared economy and the strategies and 
algorithms employed for contracting and trust that diminish 
the cracks for lawful opportunism to emerge in those 
 
 119. The literature is vast. E.g., Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility 
Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1029 (1992); Joskow, supra note 17; Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, 
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Excuse Doctrine and 
Retrospective Legislation: The Winstar Case, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 795. 
 120. Williamson, supra note 7, at 273. 
 121. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 670 (1997) (“‘[T]ailored’ default rules require lawmakers—
generally judges—to create default terms to govern a relationship between 
contracting parties based on the specific characteristics and circumstances of 
those parties.”). 
 122. Russell Fowler, A History of Chancery and Its Equity: From Medieval 
England to Today’s Tennessee, TENN. B.J., Feb. 2012, at 20, 21 (“The chancellor 
could also construct new remedies or ‘extraordinary’ solutions not offered by 
inflexible law court procedures and writs.”). 
 123. For a contracts scholar dismissing views like Korobkin’s proposal, supra 
note 121, see John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The 
United States, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1, 37 (1984) (urging that “judges . . . abstain from 
rewriting the contracts of other people [because] they are not qualified for such 
tasks”). 
 124. The contracts literature has pursued this question primarily from the 
standpoint of the default rules that courts might introduce to substitute for 
contracting that the parties did not do (generally under the rubric of 
“majoritarian” default rules), or to induce contracting they should do (“penalty” 
default rules). For discussion of the categories of default rules, see generally 
Ayres, supra note 61. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article was motivated by an inquiry into 
Williamson’s provocative theorization of a form of 
opportunism that is lawful rather than guileful. To 
supplement Williamson’s account, Part I looked to the 
agreement from Taylor v. Caldwell to trace the conditions 
that convert a good faith bargain into a recipe for lawful 
opportunism. The bargain must be naïve in a manner that 
gets exposed by a highly consequential disturbance, and the 
actor must feel entitled enough to press for performance, 
notwithstanding the circumstances. The empirical study 
confirms the salience of entitlement for lawful opportunism: 
entitlement is to lawful opportunism what guile is to blatant 
opportunism. 
This research is intended to provide the foundation for 
further study of lawful opportunism. The higher ambition is 
to help pave the way for the design of interventions—at the 
institutional (courts and law) and contractor levels—to help 
dissolve the transaction costs of lawful opportunism to the 
extent possible. In terms of the law and courts, the obvious 
question is whether literal enforcement is a necessity or 
could be avoided. In behavioral and organizational terms, 
what makes principals and their agents feel entitled enough 
to squeeze the cash value from cracks in contracts? What 
techniques are available to contractors, at the front end—
and on an ongoing basis—to deflate an overly strong sense of 
entitlement and motivate cooperation instead? These are 
questions with significant legal, ethical, and economic 
implications ripe for further behavioral and conceptual 
study. 
 
 125. E.g., Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1067, 1071 (2015) (noting that “[s]haring platforms exercise control over 
transactions by directing the form and content of listings, issuing minimum 
quality standards for providers, providing an electronic payment system, and 
charging a transaction fee for each exchange”). 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE A1. Survey Design 
 Question Label Values 
1 
Gender  Male 1 
What is your gender? Female 2 
2 
Age 
How old are you? 
Under 18 1 
18–24 2 
25–34 3 
35–44 4 
45–54 5 
55–64 6 
65 + 7 
3 
Contracting Scenario 
Conditions: Generic, Null, 
Specific 
Intention to Act Opportunistically 
Rating 
How obligated do you feel to act in a 
completely trustworthy and honest 
manner in your dealings with Ocean 
View? 
Not at all 
⋮ 
Extremely 
4 
Entitlement (ENT) 
 
Condition 1: Matched Disruption 
OR 
Condition 2: Unmatched Disruption 
How much do you agree or disagree 
with the following statement: I deserve 
a good deal in this agreement 
Disagree 
⋮ 
Agree 
5–16 
Blatant Opportunity, 
Lawful Opportunity, 
or Cooperative Acts 
 
Read each option on its own and 
decide if it is a step you would be 
likely to choose. 
Please assess the likelihood you 
would do the following: 
e.g. Call back The Ocean View to 
find out what the owner has in 
mind 
Definitely 
⋮ 
Definitely Not 
 
1 
⋮ 
6 
17 
Relationship 1 (R1) Not at all . . . 
1 
⋮ 
5 
To what extent do you see your 
relationship with Alex as 
being . . . an economic 
relationship. 
Slightly 
Somewhat 
Moderately 
Completely 
18 
Relationship 2 (R2) 
Not at all 
⋮ 
Completely 
1 
⋮ 
5 
To what extent do you see your 
relationship with Alex as 
being . . . a relationship of 
trust.  
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19 
Relationship 3 (R3) 
To what extent do you see your 
relationship with Alex as 
being . . . about money.  
Not at all 
⋮ 
Completely 
1 
⋮ 
5 
20 
Relationship 4 (R4) 
Not at all 
⋮ 
Completely 
1 
⋮ 
5 
To what extent do you see your 
relationship with Alex as 
being . . . about working 
well together.  
21 
Trust Disposition (TD) 
How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statement: 
In general, I give people the benefit 
of the doubt until shown otherwise 
-100 
⋮ 
+100 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B1 shows the correlation of the intended action 
with the grey boxes highlighting how each category of actions 
is correlated with actions of the same type. Aside from CO3, 
cooperative acts are correlated with each other as are blatant 
opportunist actions. Further, cooperative actions are 
negatively correlated with blatant opportunism—aside from 
CO3 which is positively correlated. 
Lawful opportunism has greater correlation with blatant 
opportunism than with cooperation (e.g., LO2–4 are 
positively correlated with BO1–3); lawful opportunistic acts 
are correlated with other lawful opportunistic acts. The 
results suggest lawful opportunism is viewed as a form of 
opportunism and not as a form of cooperation. 
 
TABLE B1. Correlation table of intended actions—reported 
if p < 0.05 and stared if p < 0.01. 
 CO1 CO2 CO3 CO4 LO1 LO2 LO3 LO4 BO1 BO2 BO3 BO4 
CO1 1            
CO2 0.3173* 1           
CO3   1          
CO4 0.1897*   1         
LO1 0.1596*  -0.0964* 0.7668* 1        
LO2      1       
LO3    0.1274 0.2196* 0.5592* 1      
LO4 0.0861* 0.0908*   0.0788* 0.6742* 0.5716* 1     
BO1 -0.1704* -0.0541 0.0819* -0.1105*  0.4275* 0.3770* 0.3991* 1    
BO2 -0.2474* -0.0721* 0.1326* -0.1121*  0.2281* 0.2856* 0.2490* 0.5300* 1   
BO3 -0.2658*  0.1302* -0.1859* -0.0989* 0.1674* 0.1985* 0.1390* 0.3830* 0.4906* 1  
BO4 -0.3484* -0.1332* 0.1382* -0.2247* -0.1318* 0.1033* 0.0872* 0.0835* 0.3238* 0.5197* 0.4772* 1 
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TABLE B2.  Comparative factor loadings for all variables 
considering various conditions. 
 
 a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unmatched Weather - Regulation 
Variable 
With 
Guile 
Pushing 
Boundaries 
Demand 
Money 
Cooperate 
CO1 -0.332   0.3811 
CO2    0.749 
CO3    0.3641 
CO4   0.9357  
LO1   0.8517  
LO2  0.8658   
LO3  0.6105   
LO4  0.7802   
BO1 0.5083 0.3373   
BO2 0.8143    
BO3 0.6964    
BO4 0.673    
Regulation Matched 
Variable 
With 
Guile 
Pushing 
Boundaries 
Demand 
Money 
Cooperate 
CO1    0.6258 
CO2    0.5141 
CO3     
CO4   0.8602  
LO1   0.9276  
LO2  0.7913   
LO3  0.6289   
LO4  0.8275   
BO1 0.4418 0.3538   
BO2 0.6541    
BO3 0.6406    
BO4 0.6720    
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 c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact of Opportunism Factors on Trust and 
Intended Honesty 
Respondents with higher “with guile” intended action 
scores have a lower disposition to trust (p < 0.001) and lower 
intention to act honestly (p < 0.001). They are 6.5 times more 
likely to be in the lowest 25% of respondents in regards to 
intended honesty and nearly two times more likely to be in 
the lowest 25% of respondents in regards to trusting others. 
Individuals who act with guile self-report to not be honest 
Weather Matched 
Variable 
With 
Guile 
Pushing 
Boundaries 
Demand 
Money 
Cooperate 
CO1 -0.3842   0.3952 
CO2    0.5699 
CO3 0.4122   0.4365 
CO4   0.8247  
LO1   0.9465  
LO2  0.7598   
LO3  0.6076   
LO4  0.9036   
BO1 0.5413 0.3457   
BO2 0.8664    
BO3 0.6602    
BO4 0.7009    
Weather Unmatched (Reg-Weather) 
Variable 
With 
Guile 
Pushing 
Boundaries 
Demand 
Money 
Cooperate 
CO1 -0.6236   0.3286 
CO2    0.6964 
CO3    0.3390 
CO4   0.7924  
LO1   0.9169  
LO2  0.9200   
LO3  0.6658   
LO4  0.7020   
BO1 0.4332 0.3201   
BO2 0.7807    
BO3 0.5205    
BO4 0.8455    
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and not trust others. 
However, respondents with the highest likelihood to 
push boundaries (factor 2) are not significantly different in 
their trust and only slightly less likely to be in the lowest 
category of intended honesty. 
Where respondents who intend to act with guile do not 
trust others and admit to not be honest in their dealings, the 
same is not true of those who act with lawful opportunism. 
 
TABLE B3. How outcome factors impact trust and honesty. 
Significant odds ratios are reported in bold.a 
Factor 
High Trust 
Disposition 
High 
Intended 
Honesty 
Low 
Intended 
Honesty 
Low Trust 
Disposition 
 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
Odds 
Ratio P>z 
High With 
Guile 0.45 0.00 0.31 0.00 6.67 0.00 1.90 0.00 
High 
Pushing 
Boundaries 
Factor 
1.02 0.91 1.18 0.25 0.64 0.01 0.94 0.68 
High 
Demand 
Money Factor 
1.67 0.00 1.60 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.77 0.06 
High 
Cooperate 
Factor 
1.12 0.43 1.20 0.18 0.71 0.05 0.82 0.20 
Male 0.75 0.03 0.98 0.90 1.18 0.26 1.34 0.03 
AgeUnder35 0.72 0.02 0.77 0.05 2.06 0.00 0.97 0.81 
aAggregated data across surveys; Analysis of all factors. 
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APPENDIX C 
The base contracting scenario will be seen by all 
respondents and is based on a classic contracting dilemma 
around renting a location for a performance. This is a 
hypothetical agreement. The respondents read the following: 
You produce concerts through your business, and you focus on 
festivals. For this year’s Memorial Day Festival, you have reserved 
a venue close to the ocean. The Ocean View—an Inn with large 
grounds—has offered its grounds in exchange for $6,000: $1,500 as 
a deposit and $4,500 one month before the event. 
With the venue secured, you then book the infrastructure needed—
security, portable toilets, food vendors, etc.—as well as booking the 
acts and you begin to sell tickets. 
This scenario is designed to create the potential for real 
damages, specifically, the loss of deposits paid to 
subcontractors and potential loss of revenue. The 
respondents were assigned one of three possible conditions: 
a generic condition, null condition, and a specific condition as 
follows: 
Generic Condition. The following was included: The agreement 
provides that if The Ocean View is unable to provide the venue for 
any reason, your remedy will be a refund of all amounts paid. 
Specific Condition. The following was included: The agreement 
provides that in case of a weather event or natural disaster that 
makes the festival impossible to hold at the venue, your remedy will 
be a refund of all amounts paid. 
Null Condition. No condition included. 
After reading the scenario and then responding to a 
question about their intention to act honestly, one of two 
disruption conditions is introduced to respondents—one 
concerning a natural disaster (a hurricane) and one 
concerning a regulatory change (environmental 
regulation)—which make the event impossible to continue. 
Matched Disruption: 
It is ten days before the event, and you have already paid the 
remaining $4,500, and you sold out the venue’s capacity of 3,000 
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tickets. A devastating hurricane has destroyed the shore area 
around The Ocean View. You have just received an email from the 
owner of The Ocean View: 
I have terrible news. This hurricane is even worse than we had 
feared. Power lines and telephone lines are down, and water 
service has been interrupted. Trees have been downed around the 
venue area where the festival would have taken place. Initial 
reports from the town government indicate that the venue area 
is lowest priority, and as you know, there are enormous amounts 
of destruction to attend to. I am afraid there can be no Memorial 
Day festival at The Ocean View. 
Unmatched Disruption: 
It is ten days before the event, and you have already paid the 
remaining $4,500, and you sold out the venue’s capacity of 3,000 
tickets. You have just received an email from the owner of The 
Ocean View: 
I have terrible news. The town government has issued new 
regulations for wetlands. These regulations include a new map of 
town wetlands, and our grounds (along with much of the other 
land near the ocean) qualifies as “wetlands.” Under these 
regulations no commercial activity whatsoever is permitted on 
wetlands. I am afraid there can be no Memorial Day festival at 
The Ocean View. 
In case of either disruption, the participant will be told: 
There is an option available: the state college stadium. However, 
the rental fee is an extra $2,000, and you will have no use for the 
portable toilets you already paid $1,000 to rent. 
